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The  full  body  of  research  on  the  nature  of  psychosis  and  its determinants  indicates  that  a considerable
number  of  factors  are  relevant  to the  development  of  hallucinations,  delusions,  and  other  positive  symp-
toms,  ranging  from  neurodevelopmental  parameters  and  altered  connectivity  of  brain  regions  to impaired
cognitive  functioning  and  social  factors.  We  aimed  to integrate  these  factors  in  a single  mathematical
model  based  on  network  theory.  At the  microscopic  level  this  model  explains  positive  symptoms  of  psy-
chosis  in terms  of  experiential  equivalents  of  robust,  high-frequency  attractor  states  of  neural  networks.
At  the mesoscopic  level  it  explains  them  in relation  to global  brain  states,  and  at the  macroscopic  level  in
relation  to  social-network  structures  and  dynamics.  Due  to the  scale-free  nature  of  biological  networks,
all three  levels  are  governed  by  the  same  general  laws,  thereby  allowing  for  an  integrated  model  of  biolog-
ical,  psychological,  and  social  phenomena  involved  in  the  mediation  of positive  symptoms  of  psychosis.
This  integrated  network  model  of  psychotic  symptoms  (INMOPS)  is  described  together  with  various
possibilities  for  application  in  clinical  practice.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).unctional neuroimaging
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. Introduction
Worldwide schizophrenia is considered the most disabling
f mental health conditions (Salomon et al., 2012), even though
ts etiology, epidemiology, and nosological status are subject
f ongoing debate (Van Os et al., 2010; Blom and Van Praag,
011; Schizophrenia Working Group of the Psychiatric Genomics
onsortium, 2014; Hogerzeil et al., 2014). For over a century the
chizophrenia concept has provided a conceptual framework for
lusters of psychotic symptoms that tend to have a protracted
uration, but defy attribution to any known somatic condition.
leuler (1908), who introduced the term, envisaged schizophrenia
s a group of disorders rather than a single nosological entity. Nev-
rtheless, during the past century numerous attempts have been
ade to link this variegated group of neuropsychological symp-
oms to a single etiological or pathophysiological process that may
erve as a common pathway and, thus, conﬁrm schizophrenia’s
tatus as a single-disease concept. As a corollary, schizophre-
ia has been attributed to several biological, psychological and
nterpersonal mechanisms, including psychophysical degener-
tion (Kraepelin, 1893), metabolic disorder (Kraepelin, 1896), a
ypothetical neurotoxin called Toxin X (Jung, 1907), weakness of
ssociation (Bleuler, 1911), acute infectious disease (Menninger,
927), deﬁciencies in glucose metabolism (Sakel, 1935), double
inds in social interactions (Bateson et al., 1956), victimization by
he nuclear family and/or society at large (Laing, 1959), abnormal
ethylation of catecholamines (Bourdillon et al., 1965), dopamin-
rgic dysfunction (Snyder et al., 1974), genetic vulnerability (Kety
t al., 1976), synaptic slippage (Meehl, 1990), atypical language
ateralization (Crow, 1990), prefrontal–parietal lobe functional
isconnection (Friston and Frith, 1995), membrane lipid disorder
Horrobin, 1996), and disturbances in salience regulation (Van
s, 2009). However, as none of these mechanisms applies to the
hole group of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, and
any additional risk factors (including prenatal stress, maternal
amine during pregnancy, cannabis use, urbanization, and social
efeat) have been identiﬁed, it is now customary to conceptu-
lize schizophrenia in terms of a neuropsychiatric disorder with
ultiple etiologies, multiple clinical expressions, and an (often)
nfavorable outcome. Andreasen (1999) summarized this general
oncept in her Unitary Model of Schizophrenia, and emphasized
hat the notion of unitarianism hinges on the presumed lathome-
ology – or common pathway – which connects those multiple
tiologies and multiple clinical expressions.
The repeated failure to ﬁnd empirical evidence for the existence
f such a common pathway has led to increasing doubt about the
sefulness of maintaining schizophrenia as a unitary nosological
onstruct [for an overview of the various positions in this debate see
lom (2004) and Blom and Van Praag (2011)]. This has prompted a
umber of alternative approaches, ranging from pleas to abandon
he concept altogether (Szasz, 1961; Van Praag, 1976; Bentall, 1992) . . .  . . .  . . .  . .  .  . . . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . .  .  . . . .  .  . .  . . .  .  .  .  . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  . 248
to attempts at reconceptualization with the aid of different types
of classiﬁcation (Leonhard, 1999; Van Os et al., 2000; First, 2006),
endophenotypes (Cloninger, 1999; Lenzenweger, 1999; Braff et al.,
2007) or more modest clusters of symptoms (Susser et al., 1996;
Blom and Van Praag, 2011). While the concept’s dissection with the
aid of intermediate phenotypes is considered promising (Jablensky,
2011), and a proposal to link genomics to certain neural circuits may
be viable in the near future (Cuthbert and Insel, 2010), the concep-
tualization of psychotic symptoms and their interconnectedness
has remained an elusive task.
1.1. Aim
Drawing on insights from network science, the present paper
seeks to approach the symptoms considered characteristic of
schizophrenia in a different way, i.e. by addressing different levels
of biological organization through a unifying framework. Recent
breakthroughs in network science allow for a mathematical rep-
resentation of an unprecedented number of interacting factors
in a single model (Goekoop and Looijestijn, 2012). We  apply
those insights to a substantial number of clinical, neuroscientiﬁc,
and sociological ﬁndings pertaining to the origin and expres-
sion of psychotic symptoms. Rather than attempting to solve the
‘schizophrenia problem’ by seeking to establish its alleged lath-
omenology, our goal is to deﬁne a single mathematical framework
and corresponding language with which to describe the large num-
ber of (neuro)biological and social factors that contribute to the
occurrence of psychotic symptoms as the result of interactions
between events that take place at multiple spatial scale levels of
organization. The end result will be an Integrated Network Model of
Psychotic Symptoms (INMOPS), which can be examined for its abil-
ity to explain and predict events that contribute to the occurrence
of psychotic symptoms (Fig. 1).
2. Network science
In mathematics, a network is a set of interconnected agents that
can be identiﬁed separately in space. Within networks, agents can
transfer their properties to other agents within and across differ-
ent spatial scale levels of organization. Agents may  be genes, for
example, or proteins, which activate each other through chem-
ical reactions; they may  be neurons that ﬁre and transfer their
active state onto other neurons; they may  be individual people
in a social network who share ideas or emotions; or they may  be
companies that exchange cash ﬂows in a global market (Girvan
and Newman, 2002). In each case the agents and their interactions
are modeled as network structures in which nodes are mutually
connected through links that have a certain strength or weight (as
expressed, for example, in terms of contact frequency). Through-
out the 20th century, mathematicians assumed that all networks
240 J. Looijestijn et al. / Neuroscience and Biobe
Fig. 1. An integrated network model of psychotic symptoms. The dynamic interplay
between multiple scale levels of organization and their relationship to phenotyp-
ical experience is indicated by cross-connections within and between the various
levels. Each level is governed by similar mathematical rules, as deﬁned by the mul-
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dimodular, hierarchic, and scale-free organization of the network as a whole. This
llows for the study of psychotic symptoms in different ﬁelds of science using a
ingle methodolody and a common (mathematical) language.
onsisted of agents that were randomly connected to each other
nd (on average) had the same number of links. That assumption
as challenged when Watts and Strogatz (1998) discovered that
ost nodes in biological networks are not randomly connected but
hat most of them have few connections, while the remaining few
ave many (i.e., some 20% of all nodes ‘own’ some 80% of all links).
he few richly connected nodes within networks are called hubs.
ubs can be compared to the center of a spider’s web from whence
irect access is possible to many other parts of the network. Because
f the existence of hubs, each node within a network is only a small
umber of steps away from any other node, even when their physi-
al distance can vary considerably. In social networks, for example,
he average number of degrees of separation between all ‘nodes’
people) is 5.9 (‘everyone is only six handshakes away’). This plain
umber explains why it is not uncommon for us to meet a stranger
n some distant country who turns out to be the best friend of our
est friend’s wife. Networks with this general topology are called
mall-world networks, after this peculiar phenomenon. The major
ubs that connect large groups of people tend to be public ﬁgures
uch as school teachers, CEOs, politicians, and community center
olunteers. Hubs surround themselves with large numbers of nodes
nd create numerous connections within their network. In this way
hey promote the formation of ‘network communities’, which are
ollections of nodes that are signiﬁcantly better connected with
ach other than with all other nodes in the network (Girvan and
ewman, 2002). Network communities can themselves be viewed
s yet another set of nodes in a different network at a higher spatial
cale level of organization. Thus networks may  have ‘superclusters’
hat represent ‘communities of communities’ which act as nodes at
n even higher scale level of observation, and so on. Small-world
etwork structures are found at all levels of biological organization,
arying from molecules to cells, and from neural networks to social
etworks. Hence, similar network structures and corresponding
athematical rules can be found in small-world networks, regard-
ess of the scale level of observation; this is why such structures
re called ‘scale-free’ (or fractal-like) network structures (Barabási,
009). Human beings consist of large collections of molecules,
rganelles, cells (neurons), tissues, and organs. Therefore, they can
e conceptualized as giant, scale-free network structures (Barabási,
009). Each spatial scale level has nodes or modules that are
edicated to the sensing of incoming information (e.g. receptors,havioral Reviews 59 (2015) 238–250
dendrites, sensory neurons, sensory cortices), the evaluation of this
information (second-messenger pathways and genes, soma of the
neuron, interneurons, brain areas involved in emotional and cogni-
tive (salience) processing), and response formation (e.g. lysosomes,
the axon, motor neurons, motor cortex). Each spatial scale level is
characterized by its own unique spatial dimensions (e.g. microme-
ters to centimeters, centimeters to decimeters, etc.) and temporal
dimensions (e.g. faster or slower oscillations of activity, etc.). Thus,
network science offers a common mathematical framework and
language that allows us to explore human (patho)physiology at
different scale levels of organization. Below, we approach the pos-
itive symptoms of psychosis from the vantage point of this general
framework.
3. Network science and psychosis
To date, one of the most common ways to identify groups of
agents that somehow belong together in a collective is principal-
component analysis (PCA). In medicine, PCA allows for the
detection of groups of symptoms that have a tendency to co-occur
within individuals (called ‘principal components’). PCA studies
have shown that ‘schizophrenia’ consists of multiple components
of psychopathological symptoms (Van der Gaag et al., 2006). These
components include ‘positive symptoms’ (such as hallucinations
and delusions), ‘negative symptoms’ (such as retardation and psy-
chomotor inhibition), and ‘disorganization’ (of speech, cognition,
and behavior). In most individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia,
these three basic components (or ‘syndromes’) come to expression
to some signiﬁcant degree. Moreover, they tend to go hand in hand
with other symptom clusters, such as affective symptoms (depres-
sion, anxiety, anger), neurotic symptoms (obsessive–compulsive
symptoms, phobias), cognitive symptoms (memory loss, mental
retardation) or motivational symptoms such as mania (Goekoop
and Goekoop, 2014).
Network community detection (a clustering technique based on
network analysis) became available about 15 years ago. Similar to
PCA, this technique allows to identify groups of symptoms (or net-
work communities) that have a tendency to co-occur within and
between patients. In psychiatry, such network communities show
a large correspondence (i.e. >90%) with the principal components
of psychopathology as established with the aid of PCA (Goekoop
and Goekoop, 2014). However, unlike PCA, network community
detection offers an explanation of why those symptoms tend to
cluster together: not by proposing an external latent variable (e.g.
an etiological or pathophysiological mechanism that may serve as
its long-sought-after lathomenology), but by granting individual
symptoms the status of causal agents that facilitate the occurrence
of other symptoms (Borsboom and Cramer, 2013). As these causal
agents have a tendency to create closed causal loops, all symp-
toms within a particular causal loop contribute to each other’s
existence. For example, increased tension levels may  contribute
to sleeping difﬁculties, which may  induce fatigue, which may  lead
to concentration difﬁculties, which may  lead to a proneness to
errors, which may  lead to actual errors, which may lead to a fur-
ther increase of the tension level, etcetera. This general model of
the self-organization of mental disorders is now rapidly gaining ﬁeld,
since it provides an explanation for the preferential connections
between groups of symptoms in terms of the emergence of ‘vicious
circles’ (or circularly causal relations) among individual symptoms
(Borsboom et al., 2011). As shown in our 2014 paper, a network
graph of interacting symptoms of psychopathology contains clus-
ters of densely interacting symptoms that can be readily identiﬁed
as ‘elementary syndromes’, such as Psychosis, Retardation and
Disorganization. Such basic syndromes consist of vicious circles
of individual symptoms of psychopathology. Interestingly, mental
disorders at large (such as ‘schizophrenia’) can be conceptualized
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s vicious circles between such elementary syndromes. Regarding
he elementary syndrome that we call ‘psychosis’ (a combination
f hallucinations and delusions), this syndrome can be seen as
 vicious circle in which hallucinations trigger delusional expla-
ations which, in turn, may  strengthen hallucination proneness,
tcetera. Causal relationships within this syndrome may  be bidi-
ectional and involve multiple different pathways, characteristic of
he elementary syndrome of psychosis.
In this paper we restrict ourselves to a review of the positive
ymptoms of psychosis (i.e., the elementary syndrome of ‘psy-
hosis’) since these constitute the core features of all psychotic
isorders. As is shown, positive symptoms and their relationships
nvolve changes in network structure and function across many
ifferent spatial and temporal scale levels of organization within
he human brain. Current estimates indicate that the human brain
as at least 20 different scale levels of neural organization (‘from
olecules to mind’) (Sporns, 2012). As appropriate tools to cover
ll these scale levels and their mutual interactions have not yet
een developed, we limit our discussion of neural correlates to two
lobal levels of organization, which we designate as the micro- and
esoscale levels of organization. Finally, we demonstrate that the
rincipals and mathematical laws that govern events at the neural
icro- and mesoscale levels of organization also govern the social
evel of organization, i.e., the macroscale level of organization.
. Network models of psychosis: scale levels of organization
At the microscale level, events are described at a spatial scale
evel of 10−6 to 10−3 m,  which is the level where individual neurons
ombine into neuronal networks of micrometers to millimeters in
iameter. At this scale level, the main task of networks is to rep-
esent the (combined) states of networks further ‘upstream’ in the
eneral ﬂow of information, to separate signal from noise, and to
ass on activity to networks located further ‘downstream’ of the
nformation ﬂow (Freeman, 1999). Thus, a stimulus-evaluation-
esponse network organization can be discerned already at the
icroscale level of organization. Within these networks, neuronal
ctivity is a result of neurochemical changes (i.e., changes in neu-
otransmitter signaling pathways), changes in synaptic density
nd function, and (environmentally-induced) genetic expression
roﬁles (The Network and Pathway Analysis Subgroup of the
sychiatric Genomics Consortium, 2015). This scale level is difﬁ-
ult to study using in vivo techniques, whereas in vitro techniques
ave the disadvantage of placing the important actors (network
odes) out of their natural context. To overcome these obstacles,
ndings from in vivo and in vitro studies can be combined in in silico
odels of neuronal interaction, e.g. in computer simulations. Based
n the principles of computational neuroscience, such simulations
elp to understand how ﬁring patterns of neuronal populations
hange when, for example, different receptor types are selectively
timulated or inhibited.
Below, we discuss the ability of such in silico models to cover
he correlates of positive symptoms of psychosis at the microscale
evel of organization.
The mesoscale level of organization has a spatial scale level of
0−3 to 10−1 m,  i.e., a distance of millimeters to decimeters. The
ain task of these networks is to represent the milieu externe of
he organism in sensory cortices, to integrate information from all
ensory modalities and information with an emotional or cogni-
ive content, to evaluate these data streams in terms of salience, to
evelop motivational drive, to facilitate response selection (exec-
tive functioning), to execute premotor planning, and to generate
otor output. Thus, a stimulus-evaluation-response loop can again
e observed at the mesoscale level of organization. Network activity
t this level is the net result of events taking place at all lower levelshavioral Reviews 59 (2015) 238–250 241
of neurobiological organization. The mesoscale level can be studied
in vivo using structural and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI and fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and magnetoen-
cephalography (MEG). Since MRI  has a spatial resolution superior
to that of EEG and MEG  we focus mainly on MRI  ﬁndings (although
EEG and MEG  ﬁndings are also brieﬂy mentioned).
Finally, we brieﬂy address the social environment as the
macroscale level of organization, since studies on the composition
of social networks show that this level is also relevant for the devel-
opment of positive symptoms of psychosis (Veling et al., 2014). Like
neural networks, network communities in social networks develop
through a process of self-reinforcement and suppression of neigh-
boring communities. Information pertaining to the external world
is shared among individuals, evaluated, and acted upon in a way
that is similar to the way information is processed at the network’s
lower levels of organization. We  demonstrate that such processes
may  contribute to psychotic symptoms in their own idiosyncratic
ways.
5. Network models of psychosis: the microscale level
Currently, one of the most sophisticated network models of the
neurobiological correlates of psychotic symptoms at the microscale
level stems from Loh et al. (2007). Their work starts from the cen-
tral premise that the neural correlates of percepts can be described
in terms of ﬁring patterns of individual neurons within perception
networks, and that those ﬁring patterns display certain speciﬁc fre-
quencies and amplitudes. Taking visual perception as an example,
light reﬂected from an object in the extracorporeal world (say, a
tree) activates retinal cells which, after a cascade of intermedi-
ary processes, recruit a particular subset of neurons in primary
visual cortex that respond selectively to the various subcompo-
nents of this stimulus (e.g. texture, color, movement). In conformity
with the adage ‘neurons that ﬁre together, wire together’, repeated
exposure to similar objects leads to a strengthening of the synaptic
connections between the cells of this ensemble through long-term
potentiation (LTP) (Lomø, 2003). Thus, preferential connections
are created between the neurons within this particular subset of
neurons in visual cortex, yielding what we might call – in this
case – a ‘tree network’. Such higher-order representations (leaves,
branches, bark, etc.) are formed in secondary visual cortex. When
there is no tree present in the percipient’s visual ﬁeld, the tree
network is at rest because it receives no dendritic input. When
there are only leaves to be perceived, parts of the tree network
may  become activated (i.e., those involved in the coding for leaves),
but the remainder of the network will remain at rest and no tree
will be perceived. Only when the dendritic input reaches a criti-
cal threshold (i.e. when the input picture comprises essential parts
such as bark, branches, and leaves), will the network be triggered
in such a way  that it mediates the perception of a tree. Inciden-
tally, not all parts of the tree need to be present in the visual ﬁeld
in order for the tree network to respond in its entirety. When the
input picture consists of a sufﬁciently large number of tree-like
elements, the remainder of the tree network is activated as a form
of ‘pattern completion’, which facilitates the perception of a tree.
As soon as this particular network is activated by dendritic input,
it passes its activity on to higher-order processing networks fur-
ther downstream of the ﬂow of information processing. Meanwhile,
excitatory connections that emanate from the neurons of the tree
network loop back to themselves and engage in auto-excitation
(Fig. 2). Such positive feedback loops help to maintain an active
state within the tree network, thus allowing for the creation of a
stable percept and facilitating its storage in memory. In addition,
the tree network stimulates inhibitory interneurons that connect
to neighboring neurons not implicated in the tree network, thus
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Fig. 2. Network structure of an attractor network. Two  attractor networks are shown that are interconnected into a larger network. Dendritic input selects a subpopulation
of  neurons that constitute the attractor network for that particular stimulus. Excitatory (NMDA-related) output loops back onto the dendritic input connections, thus
causing a self-perpetuation of attractor activity. Excitatory output also connects to (GABA-ergic) interneurons, which loop back to the dendritic input connections of all
surrounding neurons whose activity is subsequently inhibited. Thus, attractor networks compete for activity by promoting the persistence of their own attractor states and
suppressing activity in neighboring attractor networks. This is Nature’s way  of selecting those attractor states for which there is most ‘empirical support’. Neuromodulatory
neurotransmitters can shift the balance between noise suppression and auto-excitation (change signal-to-noise ratios), thereby allowing biases in the perception of particular
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represented as valleys or attractor basins in the landscape. When thetimuli. Dopamine 2 antagonists enhance collateral inhibition (noise reduction) by
xcitation by facilitating NMDA-receptor-mediated neurotransmission, thereby inc
hat  it can be used to describe attractor states at multiple levels of biological organi
elping to suppress any percepts for which there is insufﬁcient
upport in the perceptual input picture (i.e., ‘noise’). Thus, neigh-
oring perceptual networks are in a constant state of competition
o represent external signals (Fig. 2).
.1. Attractor networks and energy landscapes
In network science, networks that encode for particular per-
epts – such as the tree network – are known as attractor networks
Loh et al., 2007). Attractor networks are networks characterized
y a more or less pronounced attractor state, which is a preferential
low energy) state toward which the network tends to converge by
efault. Regardless of its initial state, the network will eventually
ettle for that particular state. The attractor state is a function of the
trength of the network’s own synaptic connections, formed during
rior episodes of learning (synaptic rewiring). In other words, the
ttractor state represents the information that has been stored in
he network (e.g. a percept). Depending on the amount of energy
hat is applied to the network (e.g. intrinsic noise levels or dendritic
timulation), all brain networks have lower- and higher-energy
ttractor states. The effect of this can be further clariﬁed by pic-
uring a ping pong ball which has been moved uphill by applying
nergy to it (Fig. 3). When enough energy is applied to push it to the
op, it can settle for a higher-energy stable (attractor) state. When
nsufﬁcient energy is applied, the ping pong ball has no other option
han to settle down in the valley at the foot of the hill and assume lower-energy stable (attractor) state. The tiny amount of energy
eeded for the network to assume this low-energy ‘resting state’
s provided by random depolarizations within the network itself
i.e., internal noise) and sustained by the absence of any externalcing GABA-ergic neurotransmission, whereas Dopamine 1 agonists enhance auto-
g the robustness of the attractor state (or signal). This network model is so generic
 (i.e. the micro, meso and macrolevels described in this paper).
signals. Such low-energy resting states are characterized by low-
frequency ﬁring patterns that display a certain lability due to the
fact that there is only little auto-excitation (Fig. 2). In perceptual
networks, that activity may  induce weak, ﬂeeting percepts such as
those characteristic of daydreaming, hypnagogia or actual dream-
ing. When more energy is applied in the form of dendritic input,
networks will shift from their labile, low-energy attractor states to
robust, high-energy attractor states with high-frequency ﬁring pat-
terns and the subsequent formation of robust percepts (Loh et al.,
2007).
5.2. Psychosis at the microscale level of organization
5.2.1. Healthy individuals
In the idiom of network science, positive symptoms of psychosis
are conceptualized as the experiential equivalents of robust, high-
frequency attractor states that occur in the absence of adequate
dendritic input. In other words, positive symptoms arise when
perceptual or cognitive networks enter their high-energy attrac-
tor state when all they should do is remain in their low-energy
attractor state. Several mechanisms have been proposed for this
switching from true-negative (low-energy) to false-positive (high-
energy) attractor states (Rolls and Deco, 2011). To illustrate these
mechanisms, Fig. 3 provides a schematic illustration of network
activity in an energy landscape.  In this scheme, attractor states aredifferences in energy between the resting and active state are less
pronounced, i.e., when the attractor basins are shallow, the transi-
tion from a low-energy resting state to a high-energy active state
is achieved more easily.
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Fig. 3. State transitions in attractor networks, as visualized in an energy landscape. When at rest, each network is in a stable, low-energy state (e.g. a pingpong ball at the
bottom  of the valley, or a coin lying ﬂat on the ground). When energy is applied to the network (i.e. dendritic stimulation occurs, or noise levels rise within the network
itself),  the network as a whole may  enter another stable state at a higher energy level (e.g. a ping pong ball that has has been moved uphilll by some force and settles in a
v ide). W
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dalley  at the top, or a coin that is dropped onto the ground and starts to roll on its s
ee  main text for presumed mechanisms), differences in energy levels between acti
ufﬁces  for the network to make the transition from its resting state (e.g. true-nega
The shallowing of attractor basins can occur under various
onditions. In healthy subjects, a well-known example is sensory
eprivation. As demonstrated in numerous experiments during the
950s through 1970s, the depatterning and deprivation of sensory
nformation tends to evoke hallucinations in healthy participants
ithin 24 h (Zubek, 1969). Such an extreme sensory disconnec-
ion from the external world corresponds with a lack of dendritic
nput and, hence, in a low-frequency ﬁring rate of the attractor
etwork and an increased likelihood of that network to roam the
esting-state basins of the attractor landscape. Experientially, this
s associated with weak perceptions of a ﬂeeting nature since the
ack of auto-excitation prevents the formation of strong and robust
ring patterns (and, hence, the mediation of strong and robust per-
epts). Additionally, a lack of collateral inhibition (due to a lack
f competing stimuli) decreases noise suppression and renders the
etwork susceptible to any newly emerging stimuli. Individual neu-
ons and neural networks at large have thresholds to prevent them
rom being accidentally activated, e.g. by low-intensity noise ﬂuc-
uations. In the absence of high-energy stimuli, the neurons in the
ttractor network tend to lower their thresholds (e.g. to adapt to
ow stimulus intensities in a dark room). This process, known as
eural adaptation (Clifford et al., 2007), leads to a shallowing of the
ttractor basins of the active as well as the resting state. Once this
s achieved, even small amounts of energy will sufﬁce to make the
etwork switch from its low-energy resting state (‘down in the val-
ey’) to a high-energy active state (‘further uphill’). In the absence of
ny external stimuli, the energy needed for this ‘uphill’ trajectory
n the energy landscape can be supplied by random depolariza-
ions of the network itself (i.e., ‘noise’), or by low-intensity dendritic
nput provided by any of the neighboring attractor networks that
ave crossed their thresholds of activation for similar reasons (Deco
t al., 2011). As a consequence, robust percepts are formed in the
bsence of corresponding external stimuli. These robust percepts
ay  induce the activation of other sensitized networks, thus pro-
ucing a chain reaction of false-positive state transitions. When
uch state transitions occur in perceptual cortices, the individual
xperiences hallucinations. Similarly, when these events take place
n higher-order cognitive brain regions, they evoke delusions..2.2. Patients with psychosis
In psychotic patients, less extreme conditions than sensory
eprivation sufﬁce to produce hallucinations. Rolls et al. (2008)hen the valleys in the energy landscape become shallower (lower two drawings,
 resting states decrease, and only little energy (e.g. noise or dendritic stimulation)
erception) to its active state (i.e. false-positive perception or hallucination).
explain this by linking the dynamics of attractor networks to
deﬁciencies in gamma-aminobutyric-acid (GABA) and N-methyl-
d-aspartate (NMDA) signaling found in patients diagnosed with
schizophrenia (Sullivan and O’Donnell, 2012; Lisman et al., 2008;
Benes and Gisabella, 2006; Coyle, 2006). Biochemically, the dynam-
ics of attractor networks depends on speciﬁc neurochemical
substances. Their positive feedback loops are created with the
aid of NMDA-receptor activation by the excitatory neurotransmit-
ter glutamate (Fig. 2). Reduced NMDA conductance reduces the
robustness and ﬁring rate of the active state, thus leading up to
a shallowing of the attractor basins for this state (Loh et al., 2007).
Collateral inhibition and noise reduction depend on GABA-receptor
activation by the inhibitory neurotransmitter GABA (Klausberger
and Somogyi, 2008). Therefore, GABA interneuron inefﬁcacy will
yield a decrease in the suppression of competing signals as well as
a disinhibition of the resting state, both of which contribute to the
shallowing of the attractor basin of the low-energy resting state.
Thus, the resting and active state start to resemble each other in
terms of energy levels, which facilitates transitions between the
two states. As a consequence, a network with these characteris-
tics will display loose and erratic jumps between low-frequency
resting states and high-frequency active states (Loh et al., 2007;
Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008). Experientially, these unantici-
pated state switches in human neocortex translate to the switching
on and off of hallucinatory and delusional states.
Further support for the attractor network model comes from
the elevated ratios of D2 versus D1-dopamine receptor activity
found in prefrontal cortex in groups of patients diagnosed with
schizophrenia (Braver et al., 1999). Throughout the human brain,
basic excitatory and inhibitory signaling is modulated by neuro-
transmitters such as dopamine, (nor)adrenaline, serotonin, and
acetylcholine. In attractor networks, these neurotransmitters shift
the balance between NMDA-related and GABA-ergic signaling,
thus producing shifts in signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs). Dopamine
changes SNRs in favor of noise production by reducing GABA-ergic
collateral inhibition, thus promoting the occurrence of hallucina-
tions and delusions. Since chain reactions may  occur in labile or
sensitized attractor networks and only parts of these networks
need to be triggered in order for it to engage in pattern completion,
GABA-ergic and glutamatergic changes in patients diagnosed with
schizophrenia may  principally underlie loose associations. Clini-
cally, this may  manifest as ‘jumping to conclusions’, meaning that
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atients show a tendency to link the occurrence of one event (e.g.
heir car breaking down) to another one (a visit from their mother)
nd, without much delay, assume that, for example, she must have
een the one who sabotaged the car.
Similar to dopaminergic activity, noradrenergic stimulation
induced, for example, by stress) induces shifts in the SNR in favor
f the false-positive detection of noise. The mechanism behind
his involves a decrease in both GABA-ergic collateral inhibition
nd glutamatergic collateral excitation (Hasselmo et al., 1997). A
ossible reason for this is that stressful conditions require our
erceptual and cognitive networks to be biased toward the false-
ositive detection of rivals, predators, and other threats. From the
antage point of evolution, this type of bias has important beneﬁts
or survival since it allows to minimize the false-negative detec-
ion of actual threats (e.g. not seeing a tiger when there is actually
ne there) at the cost of false-positive threats (i.e. hallucinations
nd delusions). In individuals whose attractor networks are already
usceptible to false-positive states, these mechanisms increase the
hance of experiencing hallucinations and delusions; this happens
o many psychotic patients under stressful conditions.
Thematically, delusions and hallucinations can be valued pos-
tively or negatively by the person experiencing them and, in the
eneral population, are indeed valued positively by a signiﬁcant
umber of people (Daalman et al., 2011). However, in clinical
opulations many of those experiences involve situations of a
hreatening or otherwise frightening nature. This preference for
egative stimuli again seems to involve a detection bias for rivals,
redators, and other threats. In that sense, hallucinations and delu-
ions can be regarded as an unfortunate price that is paid by some
ndividuals for a critical survival mechanism (Dodgson and Gordon,
009; Kelleher et al., 2010). Interindividual variation in this detec-
ion bias will cause some people to show an extreme sensitivity to
uch stimuli, especially under stressful conditions. Normally, alter-
tions in dopaminergic and GABA-ergic functioning reach a climax
n early adulthood (Uhlhaas, 2013). Together with the fact that
tress levels (and hence noradrenergic activity) peak in early ado-
escence (Hatch and Dohrenwend, 2007), this may  explain why the
nset of psychosis-proneness tends to commence at this relatively
arly age.
.3. Microstructural and genetic changes in psychosis
Apart from neurotransmitter concentrations, the dynamics of
ttractor networks at the microscale level of organization are also
nﬂuenced by microstructural changes in the number and quality
f synapses. It is suggested that the basis for psychosis-proneness
s laid during the gestational period, even though the clinical signs
f psychosis tend to become manifest no sooner than in late adoles-
ence (Rapoport et al., 2012). It has been shown that the brains of
ealthy adolescents undergo massive pruning of (primarily) excit-
tory synapses (in conformity with the ‘use it or lose it’ principle)
Glantz et al., 2007; Gonzalez-Burgos et al., 2008). Due to this pro-
ess, the loss of excitatory NMDA-ergic synapses tends to be more
ubstantial in adolescents diagnosed with schizophrenia than in
ge-matched controls (Glantz and Lewis, 1999). The concomitant
ecrease in (auto)excitation of attractor networks might contribute
o the instability of internal representations, and to the proneness
f these individuals to hallucinations and delusions at a later age.
nother factor that affects connectivity at the microscale level is the
se of cannabis which, apart from the direct effects of its active com-
ound tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) on neuronal signaling, affects
he outgrowth of synaptic terminals (Harkany et al., 2008; Bossong
nd Niesink, 2010; Keimpema et al., 2011). The question why  some
ndividuals develop psychotic symptoms due to cannabis whereas
thers do not, is probably best answered with reference to inter-
ndividual differences in synaptic density and expression levels ofhavioral Reviews 59 (2015) 238–250
the cannabinoid receptor. In individuals who have a local excess
of synaptic connections, a tipping point may be reached under the
inﬂuence of THC, thereby increasing the likelihood for psychotic
symptoms to set in. Similarly, hallucinogens and other psychoto-
genic substances may  alter neurotransmitter levels in attractor
networks in favor of false-positive attractor states, and thus facili-
tate the mediation of positive symptoms of psychosis.
Another group of factors that may  alter connectivity at the
microscale level are immunocytochemical changes, which may
interfere with neuronal signaling at the receptor level and with
synapse formation at the microstructural level (The Network
and Pathway Analysis Subgroup of the Psychiatric Genomics
Consortium, 2015). This may  tilt the balance of SNRs within attrac-
tor networks toward producing false-positive perceptions. A ﬁnal
factor that deserves to be mentioned in this context is histone
methylation, the microbiological process that bridges the gap
between environmental stress and levels of genetic expression (i.e.
epigenetic changes). Extremely stressful events (e.g. psychotrau-
mata) may  cause particular genes to switch on or off through
histone methylation, leading to more or less permanent changes in
gene expression proﬁles (e.g. proﬁles compatible with an enhanced
alertness to stressful stimuli). In accordance with the hostile envi-
ronment in which such changes take place, acquired changes in
genetic expression levels shift SNRs in attractor networks in favor
of the early detection of such threats; again, the experience of pos-
itive symptoms is the price that is paid for an increased ability to
pick up true-positive threats (Dodgson and Gordon, 2009; Kelleher
et al., 2010).
5.4. Clinical lessons from the microscale level
The number one evidence-based treatment option for psychotic
symptoms at the microscale level is the administration of D2 antag-
onists (i.e. ‘antipsychotics’). In psychotic patients these substances
increase GABA-ergic currents (Seamans and Yang, 2004), thus cor-
recting GABA-ergic deﬁciencies and suppressing noise levels in
networks surrounding the attractor network. As a result, attractor
networks become more resistant against switches from low-energy
(true-negative) resting states to high-energy (false-positive) per-
sistent states. In theory, the administration of D1-receptor agonists
(e.g. psychostimulants such as methylphenidate) should be able
to produce deeper attractor basins of the persistent state, since
these substances increase NMDA-mediated auto-feedback within
attractor networks (Rolls et al., 2008). This prevents the occur-
rence of state switches from high-energy to lower-energy attractor
states and helps produce more robust percepts, which is the
basic aim of psychostimulant treatment in patients diagnosed with
attention-deﬁcit (hyperactivity) disorder (AD(H)D). This hypothe-
sis also explains why methylphenidate monotherapy should not
be prescribed for AD(H)D patients with comorbid positive symp-
toms of psychosis, since this might lead to default stabilization
of their hallucinations and delusions. Since beta-adrenergic stim-
ulation decreases GABA-ergic noise suppression and facilitates
the formation of false percepts in already vulnerable attractor
networks, psychotic symptoms may  also be reduced by prescribing
either direct GABA-ergic agonists (i.e., benzodiazepines) or beta-
adrenergic antagonists (beta blockers).
To summarize, a simple model of excitation, inhibition, and
modulation within interconnected attractor networks allows to
explain various psychotic phenomena, to provide a rationale for
conventional anti-psychotic interventions, and to facilitate the
exploration of novel interventions. The agents in this model are
brought off balance by an array of different processes, glob-
ally involving neurochemical, neuroinﬂammatory, microstructural,
and (epi)genetic alterations, whereas therapeutic interventions
target these global pathogenetic pathways by shifting SNRs within
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he attractor networks back from false-positive to true-negative
alues.
In the following sections, we connect this state of affairs at the
icroscale level of organization with those occurring at higher-
cale levels of organization.
. Network models of psychosis: the mesoscale level
.1. Structural and functional connectivity
Until about a decade ago, voxel-based morphometry (VBM) of
tructural MRI  data was among the most popular in vivo neuroimag-
ng techniques used to localize brain areas in which gray-matter
olume (GMV) correlated with some variable of interest (e.g.
ask performance or positive symptom scores). Similarly, diffu-
ion tensor imaging (DTI) was used to relate local differences in
hite-matter tract integrity to certain variables of interest (Basser
nd Pierpaoli, 1996). Most functional MRI  studies involved the
ocalization of discrete brain areas in which activity markers such
s the Blood Oxygenation-Level Dependent (BOLD) response cor-
elated with phenotypical markers. During the past decade, this
on-relational approach gradually made place for a relational
network-based) approach. This development was largely made
ossible by methodological advances and the discovery of small-
orld networks (outlined above). From the perspective of network
cience, ‘alterations in GMV’ can be regarded as ‘changes in network
odes’, whereas ‘local changes in white-matter-tract integrity’ can
e regarded as ‘changes in network links’. Brain connectivity stud-
es traditionally distinguish between two types of connectivity,
.e., structural, and functional connectivity (Bullmore and Sporns,
009). Structural connectivity can metaphorically be compared to
he actual glass-ﬁber cables that allow for information exchange
cross the World Wide Web, whereas functional connectivity is
omparable with the links between .html pages on the Internet.
uch pages may  link directly to each other, even though several
ervers and routers can be involved in connecting the actual com-
uters on which the pages are stored. Thus, structural-connectivity
tudies focus on the actual white-matter tracts that run between
ifferent areas of gray matter, whereas functional imaging tech-
iques such as fMRI, EEG, and MEG  are used to study statistical
ssociations between the neurophysiological states of gray-matter
egions that may  be located various structural degrees of separation
part from each other. Since network studies examine relationships
etween brain areas rather than individual brain areas themselves,
urrent neuroimaging studies allow to explore structural and func-
ional correlates of positive symptoms at an unprecedented level
f integration.
Previous studies show that both structural and functional con-
ectivity maps are characterized by a small-world and scale-free
opology (Bullmore and Sporns, 2009). As a consequence, the
uman brain at the mesoscale level of organization seems to
isplay the same general network architecture as the attractor
etworks rendered in Fig. 1. However, a major difference is that,
n this case, the neurons in Fig. 1 do not represent single cells
ut rather substantial clusters of gray matter. The structural con-
ections between these clusters of gray matter are not formed by
ingle axons, but by white-matter ﬁber tracts that can be visual-
zed in vivo with the aid of neuroimaging techniques. Functional
onnections, on the other hand, consist of statistical relationships
etween activity levels in these areas. In comparison with neural
etworks at the microscale level of organization, connectivity maps
t the mesoscale level of organization involve highly integrated
nd multimodal brain states that correspond to full-blown mental
epresentations. Sensory cortices provide integrated representa-
ions of the organism’s milieu externe, medial temporal and limbichavioral Reviews 59 (2015) 238–250 245
structures integrate information from the sensory domains with
emotional and cognitive information, medial prefrontal (anterior
cingulate) and (dorsal) anterior insular regions have a function in
salience detection regarding this data stream, striatal structures are
involved in developing motivational drive and initiating automatic
response patterns, and dorsolateral prefrontal areas are involved
in effortful response selection and conscious executive function-
ing, while the actual planning and execution of motor output takes
place in prefrontal (premotor) and motor cortices (Sridharan et al.,
2008). Together, these processes are referred to as ‘cognitive con-
trol’. Three canonical networks can be distinguished within the set
of brain regions involved (Sridharan et al., 2008): the central exec-
utive network (CEN) is predominantly active during the execution
of goal-directed task performances, and relies on dorsolateral pre-
frontal and posterior parietal areas. As soon as individuals cease
to perform in a goal-directed manner and engage in a state of
quiet wakefulness (i.e., with eyes closed, but awake), activity levels
within the CEN drop to a minimum whereas activity levels in a set
of brain regions comprising the default-mode network (DMN) show
a simultaneous increase. The DMN  comprises medial prefrontal
regions, posterior cingulate, dorsal parietal regions, and mediotem-
poral regions. Activity within these regions is associated with
mind-wandering, fantasizing, musing, autobiographical recollec-
tion, daydreaming, and actual dreaming (Deco et al., 2011). Finally,
anterior cingulate and (dorsal) anterior insular regions are part of
a so called salience network (SN), which has a key role in salience
detection and in switching between goal-directed CEN activity and
reﬂective DMN  activity. The CEN, DMN, and SN appear to be of cru-
cial importance in the pathogenesis of positive symptoms (Manoliu
et al., 2014). Below, we  discuss the current neuroimaging literature
on psychosis from the perspective of structural and functional con-
nectivity studies involving these networks, whereas the results of
VBM and DTI studies are discussed only in relation to changes in
network nodes and links as reported in connectivity studies.
6.2. Structural connectivity and psychosis
Whole-brain structural connectivity maps of patients diagnosed
with schizophrenia show a reduction of values of small-worldness
parameters. Some examples include the loss of frontotemporal and
insular hubs, the emergence of novel non-frontal hubs (Bassett
et al., 2008; Van Den Heuvel and Sporns, 2011), a lowering of
the clustering coefﬁcient (Fornito et al., 2012; Alexander-Bloch
et al., 2010), the randomization of connectivity (Lynall et al., 2010;
Bassett et al., 2008), increases of path lengths, and the reduction
of interregional connectivity (Pettersson-Yeo et al., 2011). The loss
of frontotemporal and insular hubs may  correspond with previous
VBM ﬁndings involving the loss of GMV  in medial prefrontal, (supe-
rior) temporal, insular, thalamic, striatal, and cerebellar regions
(Shepherd et al., 2012; Fusar-Poli et al., 2012; Fornito et al., 2009,
Allen and Modinos, 2012; Gaser et al., 2004; Neckelmann et al.,
2006; Martí-Bonmatí et al., 2007; Nenadic et al., 2010). Simi-
larly, the emergence of novel hubs may  correspond with previous
ﬁndings of an increased GMV  in areas associated with delusion-
proneness (Sigmundsson et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2012; Whitford
et al., 2009). An increase in the randomness of wiring patterns
may  explain the inconsistency of previous DTI ﬁndings in patients
diagnosed with schizophrenia, varying from a global decrease
in white-matter-tract integrity associated with ‘schizophrenia’
(Sommer et al., 2012) to decreases speciﬁcally associated with ver-
bal auditory hallucinations, in the white-matter-tract integrity of
medial prefrontal areas (Van Tol et al., 2013; Rotarska-Jagiela et al.,
2009, 2010), medial temporal areas (Ellison-Wright and Bullmore,
2009), and the superior and inferior longitudinal fasciculus (Seok
et al., 2007; Shergill et al., 2007; Hubl et al., 2004; Szeszko et al.,
2008; Chan et al., 2010). Most of these ﬁndings involve the loss of
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refrontal connections, which corresponds with the loss of impor-
ant hub regions in the same areas found in patients diagnosed with
chizophrenia.
Generally speaking, a loss of small-world topology is associ-
ted with a decrease in the quality and efﬁciency of information
rocessing which is, in turn, experienced as a slowing-down of
ognitive abilities and processing speed. Regarding alterations in
peciﬁc brain regions, a loss of frontal hubs seems to be associated
ith a reduced capacity for integration, abstraction, and creation
f overview (Van Den Heuvel and Sporns, 2011). Reduced integra-
ion is thought to result in the loosening of cognitive associations,
 symptom historically marked as a core feature of schizophre-
ia (Bleuler, 1908; Friston and Frith, 1995). The central role of the
nterior cingulate and (anterior) dorsal insular region in salience
etection has sparked the hypothesis that decreased GMVs within
hese frontal areas may  lead patients to attribute enhanced salience
o sensory events and erroneously attribute endogenously medi-
ted percepts to external sources (Jardri et al., 2013; Allen et al.,
008; Fletcher and Frith, 2010). The dissolution of higher-order
prefrontal) clusters may  reduce collateral inhibition by compet-
ng attractor states, thus leading to a disinhibition of lower-level
lusters and, ultimately, the mediation of hallucinations and/or
elusions (Bassett et al., 2008). In addition, a loss of hubs may
nterfere with the ability to discriminate between stimuli and con-
epts (Zalesky et al., 2011). Such changes may  also promote the
forementioned ‘jumping to conclusions’, whereas increased ran-
omness of anatomical connections – possibly the result of the
xcessive pruning of synapses (Hoffman and McGlashan, 2001) may
romote bizarre delusions and hallucinations.
Finally, the network structure of psychotic symptoms at the
henotypical level indicates that hallucinations may  simply trig-
er delusional explanations of these percepts (a bottom-up genesis
f delusional activity). There is also evidence for the reversed causal
irection, i.e., delusions triggering hallucinations in a top-down
anner. In the latter case, higher-order conceptual regions may
nhance selective attention (i.e. alertness) to particular stimuli,
uch as facial expressions or policemen in the street. Such top-down
ffects involve increased dopaminergic and adrenergic signaling
ithin primary sensory cortices (Dodgson and Gordon, 2009;
elleher et al., 2010; Markovic et al., 2014), which may  shift SNRs
n favor of false-positive attractor states.
.3. Functional connectivity and psychosis
Changes in functional connectivity maps in psychotic disorders
esemble those in structural connectivity maps to a considerable
egree (Goekoop and Looijestijn, 2012). Again, a loss of small-
orldness parameters can be observed in terms of increased
andomness of (frontal) connectivity patterns (Cole et al., 2011)
nd a loss of frontal hubs. Since functional connectivity is thought
o lie closer (process-wise) to phenotypical experience, the study
f functional connectivity may  yield important information on the
rigins of the psychotic phenotype. Functional connectivity stud-
es typically examine associations between scores on phenotypical
arkers and connectivity maps calculated across various different
rain states that globally involve central executive, salience-
elated, and default-mode states. As observed above, these global
etworks are differentially activated during wakeful and sleeping
tates of the human brain (with a preference for DMN  activity
uring dreaming and CEN during active task performance). Since
ositive symptoms by deﬁnition occur during wakefulness, we
imit our discussion of mesoscopic changes in psychosis to func-
ional connectivity maps during the wakeful state.
Due to the scale-free nature of the network that constitutes
he human brain, similar rules apply at different scale levels of
rganization. Starting from that general principle, the CEN andhavioral Reviews 59 (2015) 238–250
the DMN  are conceptualized as giant attractor networks at the
mesoscopic level of organization that are in a constant state of
mutual competition. The CEN is engaged in auto-excitation dur-
ing task performance, while suppressing the activity of the DMN
through collateral inhibition. The reverse happens when the indi-
vidual enters a state of quiet wakefulness (not to be confused
with the ‘resting state’ of microscale-level attractor networks), and
the DMN  in turn gears up from its low-energy resting state to a
high-energy active state. In this state, the DMN  engages in auto-
excitation and in collateral inhibition of the CEN. Crucially, the
salience network (dorsal anterior insula and anterior cingulate cor-
tex) is responsible for biasing the competition between DMN  and
CEN activity levels (Sridharan et al., 2008). In psychotic disorders,
both auto-excitation and collateral inhibition are impaired. Com-
parable to what happens at the microscale level of organization,
this leads to the formation of instable percepts during active states
and to insufﬁcient suppression of noise in competing (resting state)
networks. At the mesoscopic level of organization, this combina-
tion of an increase of noise levels and a decrease of the resistance
against intrusion by noise, facilitates the mediation of false per-
cepts. Therefore, on the one hand, positive symptoms may be due
to insufﬁcient suppression of (noise generated by) the DMN  during
task performance. Additionally, a decrease in auto-excitation of the
CEN will render this network more susceptible to noise intrusions
from the DMN. Once DMN  activity ‘overrules’ the already labile CEN,
it becomes manifest at the experiential level in the form of clear,
consciously experienced delusions and/or hallucinations of a mul-
timodal, integrated, and complex nature. In this sense, psychosis
is comparable to a state of ‘dreaming-while-awake’, or a blending
of endogenously and exogenously mediated representations. On
the other hand, the activity of the DMN  is also labile (Northoff and
Qin, 2011) and, therefore, susceptible to intrusions by insufﬁciently
suppressed noise generated by the CEN. Experientially, such CEN
intrusions into the DMN  may  produce a phenotype where actual
events are experienced as unreal or dreamlike, as in derealization
or depersonalization. Moreover, noise generated by the CEN that
overrules the DMN  may  provide the neurophysiological correlate
of delusions of control.
In summary, insufﬁcient noise suppression and increased sus-
ceptibility to noise intrusions within both the CEN and the DMN
network may  promote the blending of information processing
between these two anticorrelated networks and mediate speciﬁc
positive symptoms of psychosis. We  will ﬁrst discuss evidence for
the hypothesis that network states spill over from the DMN  to the
CEN. After that, we will discuss the evidence for psychotogenic
mechanisms in the opposite direction.
Various observations seem to conﬁrm the hypothesis that an
excess of DMN  noise is responsible for the emergence of positive
symptoms. For instance, insufﬁcient suppression of DMN  activity
during task performance is a common ﬁnding in patients diag-
nosed with schizophrenia (Garrity et al., 2007; Meyer-Lindenberg
et al., 2005; Jeong and Kubicki, 2010; Woodward et al., 2011).
This indicates that these patients may  be more susceptible to
noise intrusions originating from the DMN, experienced by them
in the form of hallucinations and/or delusions (Northoff and Qin,
2011). Additionally, administration of ketamine (a NMDA recep-
tor antagonist) induces hyperconnectivity within (i.e. increases the
robustness of activity within) the DMN, which is associated with the
severity of positive symptoms induced by this substance (Driesen
et al., 2013). DMN  hyperactivity is most likely due to a net decrease
in GABA-ergic signaling. This decrease may  involve an isolated
neurochemical deﬁciency, or a structural loss of fronto-temporal
(inhibitory) hubs observed in schizophrenia. Indeed hypocon-
nectivity of (inhibitory) anterior cingulate and (dorsal) anterior
temporal regions is speciﬁcally related to hyperconnectivity within
auditory cortex in general (Rotarska-Jagiela et al., 2010) and the
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ccurrence of verbal auditory hallucinations in particular (Mechelli
t al., 2007; Vercammen et al., 2010). Reduced input from speech
erception areas, such as Wernicke’s, to frontal areas such as
roca’s, as established with measures of effective connectivity in
allucinating patients (Curcic-Blake et al., 2013), may  be analogous
at the mesoscale level of organization) to the sensory-deprivation
ffect described earlier in this paper. The loss of frontal (inhibitory)
ubs in schizophrenia to a large degree involves the salience net-
ork, which is responsible for biasing the balance between DMN
nd CEN activity levels. The salience network (SN) can therefore be
onceived as the meso-scale equivalent of the GABA-ergic interneu-
ons shown in Fig. 2, which has a modulatory inﬂuence on both
ttractor networks (CEN and DMN). Thus, a loss of frontal hubs
ay  impair GABA-ergic noise suppression of the DMN, which ‘jams’
he CEN with noise that is experienced actively and consciously in
he form of hallucinations or delusions. The role of the predomi-
antly dopaminergic salience system in appraising and balancing
MN and CEN activity is in line with the dopamine hypothesis for
he mediation of psychotic symptoms (Palaniyappan and Liddle,
012). A disconnection between prefrontal cortex and hippocam-
us during (working-memory) task performance has been linked
o the severity of positive symptoms (Henseler et al., 2010). In the
atter situation, hippocampal activity is insufﬁciently suppressed.
uch ﬁndings have given rise to the memory hypothesis of hallu-
inations, which states that hallucinations at least partly represent
nsufﬁciently suppressed memories (Sommer et al., 2012). Since
ippocampal regions are part of the DMN, the memory hypothesis
ts the global picture of insufﬁcient noise-reduction in DMN  areas
s a precondition for the occurrence of positive symptoms. More-
ver, various studies have shown that losses of prefrontal function
re associated with increased activity within auditory areas of the
emporal lobe and the experience of verbal auditory hallucinations
e.g. Allen et al., 2008). Since these regions are part of the CEN, such
ndings ﬁt the notion that aberrant DMN  activity eventually over-
ules the CEN, resulting in the active and conscious perception of
allucinations.
All the ﬁndings discussed so far are in line with the notion of
nsufﬁcient collateral inhibition of the DMN  by the salience net-
ork and CEN, as well as with the notion of increased susceptibility
f the CEN to noise intrusions due to a lack of auto-excitation
nd the resulting instability of its neural activity patterns. How-
ver, as indicated, the reverse causal direction is also possible,
.e. positive symptoms of psychosis being due to a disinhibited
EN and instability of DMN  activity patterns, possibly mediated by
 dysfunctional salience network. Various empirical observations
upport this mechanism. Jardri et al. (2013) studied the spatial and
emporal stability of the DMN  and association sensory cortices dur-
ng hallucinatory episodes, and found that instability of the DMN
orrelates positively with the severity of hallucinations. Similarly,
ncreases in DMN  variability have been described by Garrity et al.
2007), while a loss of local connectivity within anterior and pos-
erior cingulate subclusters of the DMN  correlates with positive
ymptom scores (Skudlarski et al., 2010; Rotarska-Jagiela et al.,
010) report reduced connectivity (i.e. instability) in right inferior
arietal cortex and the left hippocampus in association with hallu-
inations and delusions. Thus, disinhibition of the CEN also seems
apable of mediating positive symptoms of psychosis. So far, how-
ver, most studies show hyperconnectivity as well as reductions of
ath length in the DMN  (Becerril et al., 2011; Fornito et al., 2011;
ang et al., 2011), which suggests that the instability of the DMN  is
ess pronounced than that of the CEN. As a corollary, positive symp-
oms of psychosis may  be primarily associated with DMN  noise
ffecting the CEN (a bias that may  be the result of impaired func-
ioning of the salience network), which is in conformity with the
reaming-while-awake hypothesis. However, other networks may
lso be relevant, such as the salience network and the amygdalahavioral Reviews 59 (2015) 238–250 247
(Blanc et al., 2014; Escartí et al., 2010), which deserve more detailed
examination in future studies.
In conclusion, the mechanisms that govern the mediation of
psychotic symptoms at the mesoscale level of organization seem
to resemble those at work at the microscale level of organiza-
tion. Moreover, at all levels of organization, positive symptoms of
psychosis would seem attributable to disorders of salience (Van
Os, 2009) since eventually they involve non-adaptive changes in
signal-to-noise ratios in favor of the conscious perception of noise.
Although this hypothesis is in line with the scale-free nature of the
human brain as predicted by network science, further empirical
studies are needed to test its validity.
6.4. Clinical lessons from the meso level
The attractor network model at the meso level explains why
patients often report that hallucinations and delusions decrease
when they listen to music, sing, hum, whistle, go for a hike, or
talk to others. Activities such as these induce strong active states
in the CEN that compete with false-positive active states in the
DMN  through the process of collateral inhibition. This is an impor-
tant biological reason why patients should be encouraged to seek a
stimulus-rich environment, engage in social and physical exercise,
or conduct any other kind of activity that requires executive action.
Indeed, cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) can be seen as a system-
atic effort in gaining active, verbal, conscious cognitive control over
overly intrusive DMN  states. The re-evaluation of what is salient
and what is not is a crucial aspect of this therapy, since it aims to
alter activity in the SN and promote a better balance between CEN
and DMN  states. So far, behavioral activation and CBT seem to be
the most effective interventions that are aimed at the meso level.
Evidence that physical stimulation methods such as transcranial
magnetic stimulation, transcranial direct current stimulation and
electroconvulsive therapy are effective against psychotic symp-
toms is currently weak (Nieuwdorp et al., 2015).
7. Network models of psychosis: the macroscale level
The macroscale level of organization takes us beyond the realm
of the human brain with its micro- and mesoscale levels, into the
world of social networks. As noted above, the same mathematical
principles that govern the latter levels of organization are appli-
cable here (Christakis and Fowler, 2009). Thus, social networks
can be analyzed using the same algorithms used to calculate cere-
bral network clusters and network metrics. Previous studies have
shown that social networks form communities in which individuals
try to be as similar as possible (referred to as ‘copy-cat’ behavior,
homophily, or mimesis) (Christakis and Fowler, 2009). Subjects at
the center of such social communities tend to be healthier, hap-
pier, and more at ease than those residing at the periphery (Fowler
and Christakis, 2008; Cacioppo et al., 2009). Comparable to the
way attractor networks promote their own activity at the cost of
those surrounding them, social clusters are in a constant state of
mutual competition. At the macroscale level of organization that
may  translate to a constant desire of individuals to blend into their
own community (the ‘in-group’) and afﬁrm their common norms
and values, whereas individuals living at the borders of the cluster
are constantly tested for conformity or otherwise pushed toward
another cluster (the ‘out-group’), when considered ‘different’. As
a result, these people are more often exposed to feelings of rejec-
tion, social tensions, and habitual paranoia (Cacioppo et al., 2009).
In the ﬁeld of psychosis research, this mechanism has been sub-
stantiated by the work of Veling et al. (2014), who found that the
risk for psychotic symptoms tends to decrease as a function of
ethnic density. Ethnic density is a measure for the proportion of
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nhabitants who are members of the patient’s own ethnic group,
nd Veling et al. (2008) found that living in a neighborhood with a
igher ethnic density is associated with a lower chance to develop
sychotic symptoms. In network terms, being part of a commu-
ity of individuals with a similar ethnic background (an ‘in-group’)
pparently protects against psychosis, whereas the risk for psy-
hosis increases outside such a neighborhood cluster. Since social
solation and rejection rank among the most stressful events, the
atter situation increases the likelihood of actual paranoia and
sychosis through the process of a stress-induced false-positive
dentiﬁcation of threats (false alarms) as described above. Addi-
ionally, social deprivation can lead to psychosis in a way that is
nalogous to sensory deprivation as described in the section on the
rain’s microscale level of organization. According to the social-
efeat hypothesis by Selten et al. (2013), prolonged social exclusion
romotes enhanced baseline activity and/or sensitization of the
opamine system, thus increasing the risk for psychosis. Indeed,
vidence for increased dopamine release in the striata of young
eople with hearing impairment, who may  be at increased risk for
sychosis, has recently been reported (Gevonden et al., 2014). Thus,
he macroscale level can be linked to the mesoscale level through
tudies of social neuroscience in schizophrenia (Krabbendam et al.,
014). Stigmatization and social exclusion can create a vicious
ircle, with social isolation promoting psychotic symtoms and psy-
hotic behavior promoting social exclusion, etcetera. This circle
s bound to be more active in people already at risk for devel-
ping psychotic symptoms (Kirkbride et al., 2014). Therefore, in
ddition to the micro- and meso-scale levels that are habitually
argeted with the aid of antipsychotic medication and CBT, antipsy-
hotic interventions should also target the macroscale community
evel. Just as community medicine enforces adequate sanitation and
ygienic measures at a community level, community psychiatry
hould focus on psychohygienic measures at the level of families,
eighborhoods, villages, cities, states, and countries.
. Conclusion
The Integrated Network Model of Psychotic Symptoms
INMOPS) allows to describe the positive symptoms of psychosis
nd their neurobiological correlates at three (subsequent) scale
evels of organization (Fig. 1). At the microscale and mesoscale
evels of organization, it allows for the description of individual psy-
hotic symptoms and their relation with each other, together with
escriptions of their mediation by structural and functional alter-
tions in attractor networks. Empirical evidence for the validity
f the mechanisms examined is provided by studies describ-
ng changes in neurotransmitter signaling pathways, in synaptic
ensity and function, and in (environmentally-induced) genetic
xpression proﬁles, as well as by studies of structural and functional
euroimaging. At the macroscale level of organization, the model
llows for the description of social mechanisms that inﬂuence the
isk for psychosis. Starting from the premise that each of these scale
evels of organization is governed by small-worldness, and that the
etwork as a whole (‘from molecule to mind’) is essentially scale-
ree in nature, the model allows for the application of the same
athematical framework and corresponding language at each of its
evels of organization. This allows to indicate at each scale level, and
cross scale levels, how alterations in network structure and func-
ion increase or decrease the likelihood for psychotic symptoms to
ccur. Rather than attempting to ‘solve the schizophrenia problem’
y proposing a hypothetical lathomenology to explain the con-
ection between its multiple symptoms and multiple risk factors,
he INMOPS attempts to explain the likelihood for various positive
ymptoms of psychosis to co-occur with reference to the princi-
le of self-organization. Despite the considerable heterogeneity ofhavioral Reviews 59 (2015) 238–250
factors considered characteristic of ‘schizophrenia’, this opens up
a new avenue toward a uniﬁed framework for understanding this
complex group of symptoms and their mediation.
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